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will begin by saying that I have been working with Martin A. McCrory, Esq., coordinator of the Public Health Program and senior
attorney at the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and with
Dr. Linda Greer, senior scientist at the NRDC in a team effort to
involve and incorporate the interests of the environmental justice
community and of communities of color across the United States that
are impacted by Superfund, but who have not had equal enforcement
and protection of Superfund in the cleanup efforts in their commumties. I am going to start by providing a brief overview of some of the
issues that the NRDC is examining, in particular, concerns with
Reauthorization and the Administration's proposal, as well as some of
the specific concerns of others in the environmental justice
community.

The NRDC has long participated in the process of creating and implementing Superfund. We participated in the original authorization
of the Superfund program in 1980,' as well as in the Act's
Reauthorization m 1986,2 and we are currently active m discussions
centering on the program's reauthorization. The NRDC has been involved in the implementation of the Superfund program since its inception more than a decade ago, and NRDC has provided legal and
technical assistance to communities throughout the nation affected by
Superfund sites. Additionally, we actively participated in the
t Tins speech was presented at the Fordham Symposium, Superfund
Reauthorization: Agenda for the 90's, held at Fordham University School of Law on
March 11, 1994.
* Director of Environmental Justice Initiatives, Natural Resources Defense
Council, New York, New York. B.A., Columbia University, N.Y. Envt'l Policy. The
author would like to thank and acknowledge attorneys, Martin A. McCrory and
Deeohn Ferris for the use of previous testimony given by them on Superfund
Reauthorization on Nov. 8, 1993 before the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy,
and Natural Resources, Committee on Government Operations (McCrory) and
before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials, Committee on
Energy and Commerce (Ferris).
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). See also Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767-2811
(1980) (prior to 1986 amendments).
2. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 96169626, 9658-9662, 11,001-11,005, 11,021-11,023, 11,041-11,050 (1988). See also
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613-1782 (1986).
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rulemaking process, published reports and worked with various environmental and governmental organizations to analyze key issues in
the program.
One key issue we are currently analyzing is the liability scheme
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act,
or CERCLA.3 We are intensely interested m how CERCLA's liability scheme will develop, and I will discuss this topic in more detail
later. We have been working diligently with various environmental
groups, with local, state and federal organizations, with industrial and
small business representatives, with congressional representatives, and
with local grass roots organizations, particularly communities of color,
in an effort to analyze CERCLA and to develop a new liability
scheme that is more fair to potentially responsible parties (PRPs), that
protects the environment and does not cause a drastic increase in
taxes nor a depletion of the Fund.4 NRDC is working with the various
groups to develop a liability scheme that retams strict joint and several
liability, and yet provides an effective, efficient, and expeditious process for allocations of responsibility, mediation and dispute resolution.
Moreover, the scheme we are developing would require the government to utilize its mixed funding authority at sites in order to expedite
settlements and cleanup. We are working on a liability scheme that
will provide expedited allocations and settlements for de minimis
PRPs. We hope that this will largely alleviate some of the problems
faced by small business that have become entangled in Superfund
third-party allocations.' We will continue to work with Congress, the
affected communities, as well as the regulated communities in an effort to develop a scheme that is fair to everyone. As we have heard
this morning, everyone is concerned that a new reauthorized program
be fair to all of the interested and impacted parties.
The NRDC plans to develop a liability scheme that protects the
public, protects the environment, provides for reasonable allocations
and does not call for major increases in federal taxation and spending.
However, in the meantime, the NRDC will continue to advise Congress to be wary of liability schemes that merely replace transaction
costs associated with litigation with transaction costs associated with
admimstrative adjudication. 6 Congress should also beware of any system which simply shifts the PRP's transaction costs or other costs to
the government and taxpayers.
Currently, there are serious proposals on the table that discuss reallocating liability from the polluter to the public. One serious proposal, the Chemical Manufacturers Association's (CMA) "fair share"
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607-9675 (1988) describes the liability scheme under CERCLA.
4. Administration Floats Draft Reforms for Superfund Liability, INSIDE- EPA's
SUPERFUND REPORT, Jan. 14, 1994, at 1.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2.
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proposal,7 should be evaluated in order to determine whether it complies with the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, which may require full adminstrative adjudication on the record prior to a binding
determination of liability and allocated costs. We also plan to look at
the CMA proposal to decide whether its creation of a binding allocation scheme that determines liability, grants the right to judicial review, and grants rights to reopeners will actually lower transition
costs. The issue of reallocating liability is a critical issue that we at
NRDC believe is being overlooked by many.
At this time, I want to highlight what the Superfund has meant, and
not meant, to communities of color. At NRDC, we are particularly
concerned about the high degree of discontent and frustration with
local environmental regulation that is especially pronounced among
low income communities and communities of color which feel that
they have not been protected by federal statutes implemented for that
reason. A related development, the articulation of public works proposals connected to the previously mentioned reallocation of liability
proposals, has been emerging from interested constituencies within
these communities and arises from these community feelings.
Communities of color are exposed to environmental hazards disproportionately, and have been inadequately protected from environmental degradation by Superfund. For example, according to the
widely acclaimed NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL report, Unequal Protection, the Racial Divide and EnvironmentalLaw, which was published
in September of 1992,8 communities of color wait up to four years
longer than white communities in getting Superfund sites cleaned up.9
Moreover, not only is Superfund disproportionately ineffective, but
Superfund is also discrnmmatorily implemented. According to the

same

NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

report, permanent treatment reme-

dies were selected twenty-two percent more frequently than mere
containment technologies at sites surrounded by white commumnties. 10
In contrast, containment technologies were selected more frequently
than permanent treatment by an average of seven percent at sites surrounded by communities of color.11
7. H.R. 3624, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) (bill introduced by Reps. Boucher and
Upton refers to "assigned shares," rather than "fair shares" but has been supported
by the Chemical Manufacturers Association). See Superfund Legislation Introduced
in House;Bill Suggests Speedier Cleanups, CHEM. MARKETING REP., Nov. 29, 1993, at

5 ("Chemical Manufacturers Association says is [sic] strongly supports the BoucherUpton plan, which would replace the current joint and several liability with a "fairshare" type of system for allocating responsibility at Superfund sites").
8. Unequal Protection, the Racial Divide and Environmental Law,

Sept. 21, 1992, at S1-12 [hereinafter Unequal Protection]
9. Id. at S-4.
10. Id.

11. Id. at S-1.

NAT'L L.J.,
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report is perhaps the best

known work in this area, disparate treatment by the government has
been shown in studies conducted before and after the report. For example, the 1987 report, Toxic Waste and Race in the United States, published by the United Church of Christ, showed that three out of every
five Black and Hispanic Americans live in communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites.' 2 I was a research assistant on that report
and helped write it. The General Accounting Office documented
similar findings in 1983.13 Studies conducted in 1993 extend these
findings. The percentage of African-Americans and Latmos in commuities with National Priority List (NPL) sites is greater than is typical nationwide. 4 Communities with relatively high percentages of
people of color
have fewer clean-up plans or signed RODs than other
15
NPL sites.
This deplorable record has galvanized environmental justice activists and advocates to develop and advocate a broad range of reforms
to Superfund. Having experienced the most profound deficiencies of
Superfund implementation, communities of color and low income
commumties are umquely positioned to offer meamngful suggestions
for improving the program. These suggested reforms touch every
phase of the Superfund process, including assessment of health risks,
allocation of liability, and selection of remedial technologies.
As a primary reform, environmental justice activists are demanding
innovative programs that will constitute significant improvements in
the roles of local communities and positiomng public health as the
centerpiece of reform. The paramount concern is achieving fairness in
commumties, experiencing disproportionate impact and preventing
unfairness in the future. For example, while countless studies have
been funded and conducted concerning clean-up costs to government
and industry, few inquiries are underway concerning the costs of failure to protect human health and the environment.
These and other deficiencies reinforce the critical need for early and
continuous involvement in decisions on Superfund reform by the people most affected by these risks. There is a new process that the Administration has put forward which involves communities in remedy
selection. Historically, the community-based environmental justice
movement has concentrated on discriminatory exposures encompassmg ambient indoor workplaces, and poor economic environments.
Through this lens, activists promote a comprehensive Superfund
12. For recent references to this study, see Conme Koenenn, Clean Air for All Is
on the Agenda, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 24, 1992, at E3; Desda Moss, He Puts Waste Issue in
Plain Sight, USA TODAY, Oct. 24, 1991, at 2A.
13. For a discussion of the 1983 GAO report, see In Our Backyards: Minority
Communities Get Most of the Dumps, E.P.A. JOURNAL, Mar.-Apr. 1992 at 11.
14. Id.
15. Unequal Protection, supra note 8.
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Reauthorization Plan encompassing revisions to how sites are ranked
for listing on the NPL, establishing clean-up standards, selecting treatment technologies, performing health assessments, assuring that liable
parties are held responsible for clean-up costs, as well as enhancing
public input.
The Administration's Bill deals inadequately with the problems encountered by Native American commuities in its clean-up projects
slated to take place on Native American reservations. The
Reauthorization Bill' 6 is silent on sovereign governance and the ability of Native Americans to protect themselves and their sacred sites
from pollution exposure. A more complete approach to statutory
reauthorization, insuring availability of adequate funding and training
opportunities, as well as tribal access to EPA Superfund program
managers is needed. Sovereign tribal governments have not shared in
the technical assistance and federal funding needed to develop environmental infrastructures to levels comparable to those found at the
state level.
Tribal governments are currently unable to adequately implement
the Superfund program. EPA must be compelled to adequately fund
and work closely with the tribal nations to address the special cultural
and jurisdictional issues encountered when cleaning a Superfund site
affecting Native American communities. There are particular difficulties such as issues of tribal sovereignty, the tribal relationship to the
federal government in umting to the EPA, which has authority to conduct clean-ups, and the resources to clean up Native American reservations. This is a huge issue that we feel has been insufficiently
addressed in the Administration's Bill.
There have been some commendable steps made by the Admimstration on the issue of community involvement and community participation. The Administration Bill underscores the significance of
community input and of protecting public health.
However, section 102 of Title I of the Bill, 7 relating to community
input would be strengthened by a few modifications. The proposal
should require mandatory, early and more active citizen participation.
As drafted, this section grants extensive discretion to the government,
by attenuating public input to the remedial investigation/feasibility
study (RI/FS) stage of the clean-up process. Instead of postponing
public input until the RI/FS stage, the government should be required
to solicit commuity views as early as possible during the initial site
assessment phase. Moreover, citizens should be granted an enforceable right to participate throughout the clean-up.
The environmental justice community has discussed with the Admimstration and with Congress the need to have greater public partic16. Superfund Reform Act of 1994, S. 1834, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. (1994).
17. Id. § 102 (Early, Direct and Meaningful Community Participation).
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ipation in improving the hazard-ranking system (HRS), particularly in
terms of re-ordenng it, and re-selecting or re-configuring how national
priority list sites are chosen. On the human health aspect, multiple
cumulative and combined exposures and synergistic effects have gone
practically unexamined. These areas have significant impact on commumties of color and low income areas which are inundated with pollution sources. Favorably, the Administration's Bill, particularly
sections 106 through 108 of Title I,"8 focuses on multiple risk sources.
These sections would authorize pilot projects in commuities experiencing disproportionate exposure, require assessment of multiple risk
factors, and augment the hazard-ranking system by adding multiple
risk as a scoring factor. This is a significant improvement in terms of
enhancing what Superfund may do in the future to add sites located in
communities of color and low income areas to the NPL.
However, studies mandated by these sections need to be accompanied by an agenda which priontizes clean-up in these areas. The Bill
does not indicate what is to be done when multiple factors are considered in these pilot projects. Sanctioning these multiple risk studies
without creating a remedy leaves the effect of these provisions
unclear.
Equally important, nothing in the proposal responds to communities already in distress by requiring EPA to rescore old sites under the
new HRS. The bill only refers to new sites, not old ones. One of the
biggest problems that communities of color have had in the past was
that, even when investigated and scored, it was incredibly difficult to
have a site designated and enter the process as an NPL site when it
was located in a community of color. Many of those sites that should
have made the NPL but did not were in communities of color. Thus,
many of the communities that are most impacted are not even in the
process at all, and have no hope of clean-up since they are "old"
rather than "new" sites. Old sites must be addressed in the
reauthorization bill.
If sites are re-scored under a revised HRS which contemplates multiple source exposure, more communities adversely affected by these
hazards will be listed on the NPL and thus eligible for Superfund
clean-up. This will create the problem of developing a priority scheme
that reflects multiple source exposure.
However, additional factors in a community can also affect the danger posed to residents by an NPL site. The ranking hierarchy should
consider factors such as: the socio-economic status of residents, their
lack of access to adequate health care, deficiencies in their diet, and
18. Id. §§ 106-109 (Multiple Sources of Risk Demonstration Projects, Assessing
Risks From Multiple Sources, Multiple Sources of Risk in Priority Settings, Disease
Registry, and Medical Care Providers, respectively).
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other environmental factors whuch could elevate risks from exposure
to hazardous waste.
The small number of pilot projects and their funding are another
area of concern. In view of the potential effects of multiple and disproportionate exposures, ten demonstration projects in ten communities over five years is too few over too long a period of time in relation
to the number of affected people of color to provide any meaningful
data.
The thirty million dollars authonzation 19 to finance this venture
may be inadequate if circumstances in these areas are very complicated. Notably, the titles concerning human health protection did not
deal with the role for the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR).20 Problems associated with the role of the
ATSDR in clean-up decision-making increase the difficulty in fulfilling the Agency's mandate to develop a Toxic Substance Disease Registry and to conduct meaningful assessments of community health.
Communities are currently questioning the adequacy of assessments
performed by the ATSDR and the responsiveness of these assessments to community concerns. Many of us have looked at the relationsup between information that is gathered by the ASTDR and
how the hazard ranking2 ' is actually performed and how NPL decisions are made, and have come to realize that ATSDR participation in
this process needs to be enhanced and more firmly defined.
Finally, I want to discuss debates on the Superfund liability scheme
and the related debates on a Superfund public works program. Consistently, critics of the Superfund program have cited its liability provisions as the major existing impediments to achieving the original risk
elirmnation objective of the statute: accomplishing effective, efficient
hazardous waste clean-ups to protect human health and the
environment.
Those who are regulated by the Superfund program, community organizations, public interest groups, and experts agree that the pace of
site clean-ups has been slow. At the end of fiscal year 1993, only fiftytwo of 1,300 sites had been cleaned up and deleted from the NPL.
Remedial action had begun on only 541 sites. Thus, over half of the
sites have yet to be improved.
Over the past three years, the pace of clean-ups has been somewhat
faster, unfortunately resulting in a considerable backlog of site investigations m yet unevaluated communities for inclusion by EPA on the
19. Id. § 706 (amending CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988), by adding new
subsections; subsection (s) provides for "multiple sources of risk demonstration
projects and allows a maximum of $30,000,000 to be spent from Oct. 1, 1994 to Sept.

30, 1999").

20. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988) (describing the ATSDR).
21. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. part 300, app. A (1993) ("Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste
Site Ranking System; A User's Manual").
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NPL. For example, an examination of the fiscal year 1993 targets
reveals that while remedial design and remedial action work have accelerated, several regions have fallen short of their targets for site investigations. As a result of the emphasis on the pace of clean-ups, the
liability scheme and transaction costs have further diverted attention
and resources away from the most critical problems, i.e., getting sites
listed so that federal clean-up action can be initiated, starting with the
actual clean-up process. Many of the sites awaiting investigation are
m communities of color.
Critics point to mounting clean-up costs, including high admimstrative costs, contract mismanagement and wasted trust fund resources.
Citizens are concerned about whether clean-ups are, in fact, protecting human health and the environment. The permanence of remedies
is uncertain and the long-term efficiency of clean-up remedies is unclear. However, the most intense focus of criticism relates to claims
that transaction costs associated with Superfund enforcement and litigation associated with the liability schemes escalate expenditures by
government and private parties alike. Among insurers and responsible parties in Superfund cases, the surrogate for cost-cutting is eliminating retroactive strict joint and several liability.
These concerns as well as recommendations to improve EPA performance and cost-cutting are well documented. However, it is important to note that experts agree that costs can be reduced within the
present liability system. While some parties and insurers have called
for changes in the Superfund enforcement and liability schemes to reduce litigation (which is cited as the principal reason for clean-up delays, escalating transaction costs, and as requiring the most critical
cost-cutting measures), the federal government should explore the
possibility of streamlining the clean-up process and reducing costs
within the present system before considering a drastic change such as
changing liability.
The public works proposals that have been put forward, most notably by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), have been combined with the elimination of strict joint
and several liability. Of all the reauthorization proposals that are being advocated today, the most disturbing is the public works plan.'
Although we have heard several variations on this scheme, the basic
tenet remains the same. Under a public works plan, Congress would
eliminate strict joint and several liability for all waste disposed at any
site prior to January 1, 1987. Remedial action would be conducted by
a public works program, financed by a tax on industry, and if that
proves insufficient to cover projects, by general tax revenues.
22. See, e.g., Industry Criticalof Superfund Plan, CHEM. MARKETING REP., Feb.
14, 1994, at 7 (Rep. Swift did not believe a plan to replace retroactive liability for pre1987 sites with a public works program funded by a new tax on business was
workable).
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The public works proposal was originally created and proposed by
members of the insurance industry However, the insurance industry
has combined with mdusty and the NAACP to form a coalition called
the Alliance for Superfund Action Partnership that is lobbying heavily
both Congress and the Administration to eliminate strict joint and
several liability and to set up a public works scheme. Generally, while
insurance companies are not PRPs at Superfund sites, they face billions of dollars in potential claims by their policy holders, and they are
losing about half of their claims in state courts. It is only logical that
they would support these proposals that promise to lower their exposure and pass potential expenditures on to the regulated industries,
state and local governments, and the taxpayers. The insurance industry prefers the 1987 cutoff date since many changed their policies at
that time to specifically exclude pollution-related coverage using pollution exclusion language. When insurance representatives claim that
the purpose of the statute is to increase and expedite clean-ups to help
the affected communities cope with their environmental tragedies,
Congress and the Administration must look beyond this thin veil and
realize the true strategy at work. The insurance industry has been
quite successful in the elimination of its post-1986 liability, and now it
seeks to rid itself of its pre-1986 liability. In essence, the insurance
industry is attempting to utilize CERCLA Reauthorization to preempt state contract law and to abrogate its contractual obligations to
its corporate policy holders. While this is not a simster plot, it is
hardly altruistic. In Reauthorization discussions that may modify the
existing allocations of the clean-up burden, it is imperative that no one
sector, government, industry, insurer, or local community be unfairly
burdened.
One of the concepts that is being put forward by the Alliance for
Superfund Action Partnership is to create a trust fund. This would be
a public fund to which the insurance industry would pay an additional
one percent tax, as would many of the waste producers themselves.
The trust fund would be used to fund the clean-up as an alternative to
the usual strict joint and several liability scheme. However, if the trust
fund is insufficient to cover the cost of clean-up, then general federal
tax revenues would be tapped to fund the clean-ups. We believe that
this scheme was not the envisioned purpose of Superfund, that it was
not the intent of the bill as it was originally proposed, and we do not
believe that a Reauthorized bill should follow it and pass along costs
in tis manner.
We at the NRDC are concerned that small generators be treated
fairly in Reauthorization. Earlier, Mr. White talked about the new
construct for de mntmis parties.' That is a concept that the NRDC
23. William A. White, Reauthorization Overview: EPA's Perspective, 5 FORDHAM
ENvTm LJ. 299, 302-04 (1994).

326

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

and some of the small business manufacturing organizations have already discussed together.
There are so many interests and so many interested parties involved
in the Reauthorization Bill that we now find parties working together
who previously had only sat down across courtroom tables as opponents. However, we remain particularly concerned that a constituency
that has not had its particular needs adequately addressed, namely the
nation's communities of color, should receive more consideration in
the Administration's bill. We remain concerned about issues of development in urban areas that have been contaminated, but not remedied. We are interested in seeing economic development regenerated
in those areas, but not at the cost of human health. We want to see a
program that provides for cleaning up sites using the best available
technology and that delivers an impetus for industry to return to urban areas and to participate in economic revitalization and not contmue their flight to the external suburbs.
There are many Reauthorization issues that the NRDC is considering. However, our most critical issue is maintaining strict joint and
several liability and making sure that commumties of color have adequate and equal protection under the new Reauthorized bill.

